By Osman Softić || 20 January 2025

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire deal finally began to come into force on January 20. 2025. after many failed attempts by negotiators, under the auspices of Qatar, Egypt and the US, to reach a just and viable cease fire agreement and put an end to the carnage of the Palestinians of Gaza. Genocide of the dispossessed Palestinians by the most extremist Zionist regime since 1948 continued unabashedly for 15 months, not only due to intransigence of the Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu, whose regime turned its vengeance for the Hamas “prison break-style” attack dubbed the Al-Aqsa flood against the Israeli occupier on October 7. 2023, into genocide; but because of an unprecedented support Israel had received from the outgoing Biden administration in Washington and its compliant vassals in Europe.

The US-Zionists agenda

The Biden administration (especially its inner circle) was filled with some of the most anti-Palestinian officials fiercely committed to the Zionist cause like no other administration in modern history of the United States of America. Hence Biden has been labeled “the genocide Joe” by his detractors across the world. Under the US protection and tutelage, the Netanyahu Israeli regime, reinforced by some of the most extreme zealots from religious Jewish extremist parties and the settler movement, unleashed the genocidal war of mayhem and destruction on the Palestinians of Gaza, but also killed at least 400 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, under the pretense of total elimination of Hamas and other armed resistance groups.

Benjamin Netanyahu, an indicted war criminal (by the International Criminal Court – ICC), aided and abetted by Joe Biden, AIPAC and other Israeli lobby groups in Washington, have for 15 months been committing televised genocide against the innocent civilians of Gaza, a crime which modern history of mankind had never seen before. Netanyahu has finally succumbed to the pressure by Donald Trump and agreed to the deal, although Biden claimed the credit for it, which is absolute nonsense. Netanyahu’s decision to cave in to pressure angered his coalition partners Itamar Ben Gvir, the minister of security who have since left the Israeli coalition government, protesting the ceasefire deal, while Bezalel Smotrich, finance minister, threatened to bring down the Netanyahu government unless the genocide is continued after the first phase of ceasefire. Hamas has already honored the deal and the first three Israeli female hostages were released from Hamas captivity on Sunday, January, 20., while the Israeli forces continued to bombard the Palestinian camps sheltering Palestinian disposed civilians killing dozens.

Jubilation and joy replaced fear of death and destruction after 471 days of relentless massacres of Palestinians by the Israeli army. According to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 46,876 Palestinians have been killed, and 110,642 wounded in Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza starting on October 8, 2023. However, the UK-based Lancet medical journal places the number of killed Palestinians to more than 67,000. Ceasefire agreement should stop the Israeli genocide, enable release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, and ensure phased withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from Gaza. It should also facilitate a gradual return of the displaced Palestinians to their destroyed or non-existent homes, for which to be viable the reconstruction of Gaza needs to be undertaken, a task easier said than done.

The ceasefire

The agreed ceasefire will be implemented in three phases, each lasting six weeks. During the first phase Hamas is to release thirty-three hostages (women, children, and those over the age of fifty). Israel has committed to releasing several hundred Palestinian prisoners, totaling 1,000. During that phase, the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF) should begin its withdrawal from some areas of Gaza and will allow for a significant increase in humanitarian aid to reach Gaza. There are signs of humanitarian aid convoys already slowly creeping into Gaza. In the second phase, Hamas should release the remaining hostages while Israel withdraws from Gaza. The third phase would include the return of the bodies of the dead hostages and the beginning of the reconstruction of Gaza.

The key question remains, whether the ceasefire will hold, as the Israeli parliament (Knesset) is yet to vote in favor of the ceasefire. Will the ceasefire mean the end of the war, how the process of rebuilding Gaza will proceed and at what pace, who will finance its reconstruction, what sort of administration will be allowed to rule Gaza? These are just some of many questions that are yet to be answered and there is no consensus over these issues, neither among mediating powers which led the negotiation process, nor among regional Arab countries, nor, for that matter, among the Palestinian factions themselves. Despite some earlier agreements between Hamas and the Fatah in Cairo, Palestinian camps appear to be divided on the future administration of Gaza, that is if they are allowed to govern it. This will largely depend on what position the future Trump administration will take, as well as on whether the Israeli side will honor the agreement.

The hijacked Palestinian Authority (PA)

On the other hand, we should not forget that the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, for the past two decades (largely by authoritarian methods aided by Israel and the US), to ensure Palestinians are kept under control, has lost its legitimacy, both among broader Palestinian populace as well as among his own Fatah faction. Hence, the PA’s security structures have also been carrying out repressive measures against the armed resistance in the occupied West Bank. According to some reports, Abbas, in these repressive operations against his own people in which more than 10 Palestinians have been murdered, does not even have the support of members of his own administration.

PA itself appears to be bitterly divided and incoherent and has recently been reshuffled by Abbas to ensure loyalty to him. Nevertheless, Abbas has been opportunistically trying to endear himself both with the Israelis and the incoming Trump administration, in order to legitimize himself and the PA as a viable player capable of administering Gaza in the future, under the Israeli and American tutelage, should the ceasefire survive. Abbas and the PA need the support of Washington and Israel for future control over Gaza in the absence of support and legitimacy by the Palestinian people and the PLO itself, over which he presides. Abbas has used the Mussolini style dictatorial powers and merged his control over Fatah, the PLO (which consists of many factions) with the Palestinian authority (PA) to consolidate his grip on power, which in reality are only the trappings of power enabling opportunities for corruption and nepotism (the real power lies in the hands of Smotrich and Ben Gvir).

The PA is under occupational protection by Israel, but is still able to disperse some largesse, albeit miserable due to corruption within the Palestinian authority. PA is serving as enforcer of Israeli occupation. Hence his security forces crack down on Palestinian protesters, further complicating and keeping the Palestinian people and its body politic divided as never before while blaming the resistance in the West Bank on the Iranian malign influence in the process. In this way, Mahmoud Abbas and the PA aim strive to keep competitive Palestinian political forces and potential challengers at bay.

PA being heavily funded by the US is this, pleasing Americans and Israelis, and ensuring continued support by the wealthy Arab monarchies, some of which, such as Qatar which clearly support Hamas, while others (UAE and Saudi Arabia) support Fatah. Abu Dhabi is likely to emerge as a player in Gaza’s future administration, in some capacity, which is a serious challenge to Abbas’ ambitions despite his old age. In fact, Abu Dhabi may even try to impose its own preferred Palestinian leader, Mohammed Dahlan, who lives in Abu Dhabi. Dahlan is an astute and ruthless political operator with huge experience and network in Gaza. He was a former Fatah security chief in Gaza prior to 2007 and appears to be a major rival to Abbas for the control of the PLO and the Palestinian authority. He may emerge as a serious contender to replace Abbas should this power structure created by the failed and discredited Oslo process survive the Palestinian internal power struggles and discontents for it by the Trump administration.

Trump apparently signaled that he had no appetite for the future political central role of the PA. Trump would rather cut it down to size and focus only on its security and business components alone. Israel, although it has been a major beneficiary of the PA administrative, and especially the security role in the overall occupation strategy, may well decide to dump Abbas under the centripetal forces militating against its outdated role in the Palestinian body politics. There is also an option and a chance for the PLO, and by extension the PA, to be rejuvenated by infusing into it fresh blood. One of the likely candidates would be Marwan Barghouti, who is likely to be released from a lengthy Israeli incarceration. He could play a critical role in the future equation. There are so many variables at play here, and it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty how this highly complex Palestinian politics will play itself out. Mohammed Dahlan had some resonance with Hamas, given his Gaza’s origin, so there may even be some sort of hybrid combination worked out to produce a semblance of reform and the fresh approach to the Palestinian path to statehood, while keeping Hamas at bay, which clearly came out triumphant albeit badly battered.

The fragile ceasefire

The Gaza ceasefire remains fragile as it is complex. It is also fraught with numerous risks and could be easily derailed. Its success will depend on many variables, not least on how the international community and its powerful western component will view Israel’s notions of security. The mantras such as “the right of Israel to exist” or the right to “defend itself” and other platitudes, which are often used as excuses and justifications for Israeli crimes against Palestinians, will need to be approached more objectively.

What direction will the regional efforts such as thwarted Israeli-Saudi normalization will take, whether the Ansarullah (The Houthis) military operations in Yemen will cease, how Iran will react and whether there will be the Iranian retaliation against Israeli aggression (True Promise III) that Iran has allegedly delayed (but not completely abandoned) in order not to undermine the integrity of the Gaza ceasefire negotiations. The agreed ceasefire should at least end one of the most difficult and the longest painful chapters to date in an asymmetrical war between Israel and the Palestinian armed resistance of Gaza.

Tragically, Gaza has been completely destroyed, with tens of thousands of innocent lives lost over the past fifteen months. Israel, on the other hand, failed to accomplish its stated war aims, except committing genocide. Nevertheless, Israeli officialdom claims that Israel as a state is safer today than it was on October 6, 2023, although many serious experts both in Israel and worldwide believe that Israel has never been in a more precarious position, not only militarily and economically, but also psychologically.

Israeli political turmoil

Political turmoil within Israel is fraught with many contradictions and challenges reminiscent of a smoldering civil war. The Israeli regime, of course, presents the truce as its triumph and as the defeat of Hamas. The Zionist state sees the conflict in the Middle East in general as a wider interconnected military theater based. In particular, Israel’s purported success in Lebanon against Hezbollah, which has been weakened militarily, and politically, whose leadership has been decimated, and the election of the new Lebanese president is also seen in Tel Aviv as a success and in alliance with Israel and America’s regional hegemonic goals. This is complemented by the demise of the regime of Bashar Al Assad which has been overthrown. Regional influence of Iran has also been weakened not only according to Israeli and Western narratives, but by some self admissions.

However, the Lebanese and Palestinians see things differently. They believe Israel has been defeated. Therefore, they see the outcome as their victory simply because they endured the total war for so long. The Palestinians were not expelled in what was meant to be a new Nakba, as announced by Israeli extremist politicians and generals. As for Hamas, not only that Israel failed to destroy it, but it was forced to accept it as an equal negotiating counterpart (although not directly). Israel has lost more than four hundred soldiers in Gaza, according to official statistics, while hundreds of soldiers were wounded. This is of course a conservative figure as Israel hides its true number of casualties. For Israel’s level of tolerance even these figures are unpalatable, although it is a miniscule number compared to the number of Palestinians killed.

For many Arab states and European countries, the conflict marked a turning point and sparked debates about the possibility of establishing a sovereign and independent Palestinian state. On the other hand, Israelis still do not accept the idea that after October 7 (the greatest loss for the Jewish people since the Holocaust according to Israel), how on earth could the international community even think that now is the right time to create an independent Palestinian state, an Israeli narrative goes. The prevailing school of thought in Israel is that such an outcome would increase the chances of another October 7-style attack.

The Israeli genocide, and the feeling that this state is beyond the reach of international law and its persistent oppression, tortures, dispossession and denial of human rights to Palestinians, the policy of occupation, and especially the genocide, are indeed factors that have contributed to the rise of global anti-Semitism, but this is solely the fault of Israeli genocidal campaigns and policy of intransigence despite violations of international law.

What lies ahead?

Israel is still obsessed with its desire to “reorganize” the region of West Asia over which it wants to establish hegemonic control. The wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria somewhat provided reassurance that a reshaped Middle East is within Israel’s reach. However, Hezbollah prevented an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and survived. Yes, it was weakened, yes, its pragmatically agreed to concessions in favor of the unity of Lebanon as a state. Israel is encouraged that, for the first time in the past two decades, Hezbollah may not have a major say in Lebanon.

The war in Lebanon, from Israel’s point of view, also helped to end the Assad regime in Syria, and Iran, according to Tel Aviv, is now in “the weakest position in the region since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.” This statement is strongly rejected by Iran and by many analysts, both as inaccurate and misleading. Despite the ceasefire, which no one can claim will hold, it is less clear what lies ahead in the long-term between Israel and Gaza, as well as the future of the West Bank. There have been open talks about annexation which Trump could reportedly approve.

As David Hearst, concluded in the Middle East Eye: “Gaza has shown to all Palestinians and the world that it can withstand a total war without moving from the ground on which it stands. Gaza has told the world, with justified pride, that the occupiers threw everything they had at us, but they could not produce a second Nakba.” On the other hand, as this analyst notes, Gaza has taught Israel a lesson that Palestinians exist and that they will not allow to be pacified until the Israelis agree to equal treatment for Palestinians as well as equal rights for both peoples, the Arabs and the Jews, who live in the geographical space of the historic Palestine, from the river to the sea.

Osman Softić is a Research Fellow at the Islamic Renaissance Front. He holds a BA degree in Islamic Studies from the Faculty of Islamic Studies of the University of Sarajevo and has a Master degree in International Relations from the University of New South Wales (UNSW). He contributed commentaries on Middle Eastern and Islamic Affairs for the web portal Al Jazeera Balkans, Online Opinion, Engage and Open Democracy. Osman holds dual Bosnian and Australian citizenship.