19 December 2025
Nader Hashemi is the Director of the Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding and an Associate Professor of Middle East and Islamic Politics at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He obtained his doctorate from the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto and previously was an Andrew W. Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Northwestern University and a Visiting Assistant Professor at the UCLA Global Institute. Nader Hashemi was previously a Director of the Center for Middle East Studies and an Associate Professor of Middle East and Islamic Politics at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies. During his brief visit to Kuala Lumpur recently, we managed to have a conversation with him relating to his field of expertise. This interview was conducted by Ahmad Muziru Idham, Research Fellow at the Islamic Renaissance Front on Monday evening, 8 December 2025 at the EQ Hotel, Kuala Lumpur.
Muziru: First, I would to welcome you again to Kuala Lumpur. You had been to Kuala Lumpur under the invitation of the Islamic Renaissance Front thrice before the COVID-19 pandemic including for our Summer School. You also managed to be present during the book launch of the Malay translation of your book: Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies which we translated and published as Islam, Sekularisme, dan Demokrasi Liberal: Membentuk Teori Demokrasi untuk Masyarakat Muslim. We hope the visit this time will bring warm memories of your visit before, of course, with your current prestigious position as the Director of Alwaleed Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding (ACMCU) at Georgetown University, Washington, taking over from the renowned, Professor John L. Esposito.
Professor Hashemi, you were a professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, University of Denver, before. As of recently, there is a new discourse emerging whereby this particular designation is being increasingly replaced by the wording “West Asia”. How do you see this, has this colonial and Eurocentric designation “Middle East or Middle Eastern” been for far too long embraced by both Western and Muslim scholarship and should it be replaced with a more appropriate and accurate name?
Nader Hashemi: I have two views on this topic. I understand the argument that the phrase Middle East is inherently Eurocentric and biased because when we say something is in the middle, we assume a particular vantage point, and in the context of the term “The Middle East,” this vantage point is a Western vantage point; is a European vantage point with roots in the history of Western control of this part of the world. Thus, it has been rightfully suggested this term is biased, distorted and a one-sided way of looking at the world. Over the course of the latter part of the 20th century, scholars of the Middle East, esp. those sympathetic to historical injustice, came up with the idea that, we should adopt a new term for the Middle East that will promote more objectivity and honesty in understanding different parts of the world, free of colonial and imperial baggage from the past.
Thus, it has been suggested that West Asia is a better term to use. I’m sympathetic to this argument and its usage to refer to this part of the world. I wish that right from the beginning we just used the term West Asia. The objectively reality, however, is that the term Middle East now has become so universal and ubiquitous that even people in the Middle East – who speak the languages of the Middle East – use the term Middle East.
So if you speak Persian as I do, people refer to this region as the term Khāvar-e miyāneh, which is a literal translation of Middle East. In Arabic, the term Middle East is translated as ash-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, and people use this term within the Arab world. The challenge of using the term West Asia when you’re speaking to a broad audience or when you’re speaking to public audiences in general and if you us West Asia instead of the Middle East, you run the risk of losing your audience. They won’t immediately know what you are referring to. My own view is that if you feel comfortable using the term West Asia, I will not object. I sympathize with this nomenclature. I use the term Middle East, however, when I teach my courses, when I describe who I am, because a broader audience both in North America and around the world, immediately know what I am referring to.
Muziru: You have recently mentioned that Malaysian British colonial practices of oppression including killing and concentration camps was used as a pattern for colonial repressive policies in Africa, primarily in Kenya. Why do you think a genuine left-wing political discourse has never found a fertile ground in Muslim-majority Malaysia? Do you think that colonial mindset is still prevalent in a collective Malay consciousness whereby there is a fear of radical left and progressive ideas, whereas at the same time Muslims easily rush to identify with Zohran Mamdani’s mayoral victory in New York despite his espoused left-wing ideology?
Nader Hashemi: You have to answer that question, not me. I’m not Malaysian. I don’t know why this discourse is not taken off in Malaysia or exactly what the specific reasons are. I love to visit Malaysia. I interact with people like you; I’m interested in what people are saying. But the answer to your question, I can’t answer that question because I haven’t studied Malaysian history and politics sufficiently to know why this term and this phrasing has not some deep roots in Malaysia. I suspect the answer is similar to other Muslim countries. In other words, a new politicized and religious-based discourse has managed to articulate a social justice and anti-imperialist agenda displacing left wing groups that once owned this intellectual space.
Muziru: So maybe in other region, people tend to follow right-wing ideologies rather than left-wing ideologies?
Nader Hashemi: In general, I think people tend to follow analyses, interpretations, and framings that are more accessible and more widely promoted. What often happens is right-wing narrative are more ubiquitous because they have more money and more resources. People who go to establishment schools tend to be exposed to a particular interpretation of history that is shaped by government policy. In fact, when government policy is aligned with or close to the West – the United States – this shapes how history and politics is taught. I realize this is only a partial explanation.
Muziru: Do you see this as a problem of populism, specifically right-wing populism?
Nader Hashemi: It could be a problem of right-wing populism. One would have to trace the origins of this discourse and how it has manifested itself over the course of modern Malay history. If you go to other parts of the global south, like in South Africa for example, I think you find something very different, where there is a more critical analysis of these questions.
Muziru: Okay. Professor George Quinn from Australia teaches Indonesian (Bahasa) Indonesia and Javanese languages recently mentioned that two major centres for the study of Javanese language are based at universities in Japan and in Israel, not in Indonesia. Interest for Javanese language in Israel, according to Israeli scholars, was justified with arguments that Israel wants to show the world that there can be a “new Islam” a “non-Arab Islam”. So, do you think that language has been weaponized to foment disintegration of post-colonial nations such as Indonesia for easier hegemonic control by the West?
Nader Hashemi: That’s one possibility. I didn’t know that Israel was promoting the teaching of the Javanese language. It could be for reasons that are rooted in sinister foreign policy calculations connected to Israeli policy or American policy. But then, there’s the question of Japan. I don’t view Japan today as an imperial country that’s seeking to try and dominate and control the world. So, I don’t necessarily attach any negative connotation to the fact that somebody in Japan is teaching the Javanese language. In general, I think the teaching of cultures and languages are a good thing. It sounds Japan is trying to understand the world and they’re promoting the understanding of Javanese history, culture and languages.
In the case of Israel, it’s different because Israel is now viewed in the Global South as a colonial settler state. It is also rightly seen as an apartheid state, and, after October 7th, as a genocidal state. So, what Israel does in terms of its government policy raises serious questions about objectivity and intent. I don’t know if this Israel program has any government connection or if it’s simply a serious attempt by Israeli academics to understand the question of Javanese history and culture.
Muziru: I want to raise an argument from Walter Mignolo, a scholar on decoloniality from Argentina. He argues that colonizers always use language as a tool to colonize people. Referring to the case of Israel and Palestine, they tend to colonize Palestinians, sometimes imposing their language on the Palestinian people, which contributes to processes of genocide and epistemic violence. How would you respond to this?
Nader Hashemi: Yes, that’s certainly true. You can see this happening in Israel all the time, particularly in its policies – not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. For example, Israel does not refer to the West Bank as the West Bank; instead, it calls this area Judea and Samaria, using historic Jewish references to claim ownership of the land and to deny the indigenous Palestinian population their rights, implying that they are not the legitimate inhabitants because they are not Jewish. This form of Israeli control via language seeks to justify a colonial land grab. This happens all the time in other colonial context. Language is used as a tool to advance imperial interests, shaping the way people think to facilitate physical control and domination over others. This is not unique to Israel; every colonial and expansionist power throughout history has used these types of tactics.
Muziru: Okay. Next question. Malaysian consecutive governments over the years have used slogans highlighting the role of particular prime ministers. For example, previously we had Islam Hadhari as a slogan, and currently the government uses Malaysia Madani. We do not see such practices in Christian countries. Why Muslim nations shy away from the politics of some sort of an Islamic version of Liberation theology as once promoted in South America but seem to cling to conservatism in economic and social affairs, despite the fact that Islam came as a revolutionary message challenging the existing order at the time?
Nader Hashemi: I would disagree with the premise of your question, because Christian and Western countries frequently use this type of language. In the United States, you frequently hear the term Judeo-Christian civilization used more and more by the right, particularly conservatives and the Republican Party. The United States, we are told, is a Judeo-Christian civilization, meaning Christians and Jews have more rights, and if you’re Muslim or from a different civilizational tradition, you are not considered an equal person (not legally but culturally).
So in other countries, and this is a big theme right now in populist discourse around the world – in India under Modi, in parts of Europe – these populist politicians and movements are trying to claim that there is an authentic identity that should define the nation-state, and anyone else who doesn’t fall within that narrow understanding, in other words, if you’re an immigrant or if you have a different religion that’s not Christian or white, you’re not really welcome here.
So, you can see this trend happening right now in other Western countries. It’s not unique to Muslim countries. I think this whole tactic of using these terms is a tactic that politicians and political parties employ to use the emotional attachment that people have to their country, to their civilization, to mobilize citizens towards specific policies. It can be very dangerous, because this excludes people who are citizens of the country but don’t fit into that framework of cultural understanding.
Muziru: You have devised your own theory as to why the Palestinian struggle cannot be explained through antisemitism as it has been implanted to Muslims by the Zionist supporters. You – and you are not alone in this – argue that colonialism and anticolonial struggle is the best framework for studying Palestine question, and that this explains the phenomenon, what some scholars call “ a disproportionate” focus on Palestine by the Muslims all over the world, despite the fact that millions of Muslims have been killed elsewhere, often by other Muslims. It leads to the observation that many people are overly focused on the genocide in Palestine while ignoring the fact that cases of genocide are also occurring elsewhere. What is your response to this phenomenon of selective attention?
Nader Hashemi: The reason why the question of Palestine is unique is because the power relationships at the core of Israel/Palestine conflict overlap and coincide with the story of Western colonialism and the struggle for decolonization. As Pankaj Mishra reminds us, the struggle for independence from the West was the defining event for many countries in Asia and Africa during the 20th century. If you recall the whole history of imperialism, colonization, and then the struggle for decolonization in most of the non-Western world, this was very much a story of white European countries exerting control over the non-Western world and the struggle of these countries in Africa and Asia to break free and become independent.
After World War II, the United States replaced Britain, France, and Europe as the dominant power and, in many ways, continued these same types of policies but in a different form that ultimately denied people their right to self-determination. What we see in the case of Palestine that separates from the case of Sudan or Syria, the Uyghur genocide in China, or the genocide against the Rohingya in Myanmar are the actors and the power relationships. First, it is not the same Western colonial countries that dominated much of the world that are today involved in the Uyghur genocide; it is China, specifically the Chinese Communist Party. In the case of the genocide in Sudan, it is the Rapid Support Forces, backed by the United Arab Emirates, that is directly responsible for the genocide. The West is not directly complicit in this genocide. The same applies to the case the Rohingya in Myanmar. In the case of the Gaza Genocide, the West, especially the United States and the UK are complicit given their arms sales and political support for Israel.
All genocides are not the same. In the case of Palestine/Gaza the same countries that were responsible for colonization, dehumanization, and subjugation during the 19th and 20th centuries are once again involved mass suffering via their support for the genocide of the Palestinian people via support for Israel. When you look at the details of the story that explains the genocide in Gaza, it has very similar elements that map onto the history of Western colonization and domination in large parts of the Global South. In many ways, it is the same actors – the same countries – that are responsible for genocide today, hence the moral outrage and the powerful moral resonance it produces in the Islamic world and the Global South. In other words, there is a powerful sense that history is repeating itself.
Finally, the clear double standards in the case of Palestine are readily apparent to most Muslims and people in the Global South. People see that the West takes a very strong stand on genocide in Sudan – the United States officially recognizes Sudan as experiencing genocide. The United States also officially recognizes that China as guilty of genocide against the Uyghurs. Yet it refuses to recognize what Israel is doing as genocide (notwithstanding the massive human rights documentation on this topic). In fact, not only does the US/UK fail to recognize that genocide is occurring in Gaza, it is actually backing and arming the perpetrator of genocide and while simultaneously silencing and sanctioning people who speak out against the genocide in Gaza. You do not see this in other cases of genocide, which adds to the anger and frustration because the double standards are so obvious, blatant and morally repugnant.
Muziru: Okay. So, How do you explain the silence and passive stand, some would even say complicity, of most Arab and Muslim governments towards Israel in the face of outright genocide of the Palestinians of Gaza? Arab countries were helping Israel with trade, supplying oil, etc. This paradoxical game is complex for ordinary Muslims to understand and some of them may even abandon Islam because of this.
Nader Hashemi: This this is a very important question. Thank you for asking. I think this is a question that every Muslim who cares about the future of the Islamic world needs to ask themselves: the question of the complicity of Muslim countries, and particularly Muslim leaders. I want to draw a clear moral distinguish here between Muslim countries and their peoples and Muslim ruling elites and leaders. The overarching fact that is relevant here is tha that most Muslims live under autocratic regimes where the people have no voice. If you focus on the Arab world, this is very clear: Arab societies are ruled by authoritarian regimes – some of them brutally authoritarian – who fear their own people and are fundamentally interested in staying in power. To maintain their power, they seek to establish close relationships with the United States and Israel.
Many of these leaders feel that the closer they are to the United States and the more they support it, the more it will help them remain in power. The question of Palestine poses a deep threat to authoritarian leaders in the Muslim world because Palestinian suffering is a marker of identity for many Muslims. If you are an authoritarian leader, you do not want your people to be angry, upset, or mobilized in the form of street demonstrations. From this perspective, Palestinian suffering is a threat to these Arab states because it generates anger and resentment over the state of politics and basic questions of injustice. In this equation, the interests of these Arab leaders align much more closely with Israel and the United States, who aim to silence the Palestine question and maintain the authoritarian status quo. This was the core of the Abraham Accords. Thus, any form of Palestinian nationalism that challenges Israel and Western interests is seen as a threat to these Arab leaders, many of whom are backed by the West in different ways.
So, from the perspective of an Arab leader – let’s say in Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia – they look at what’s happening in Gaza and see people there taking up arms and fighting against Israel as a threat. If they are successful in pushing back at Israel, defeating Israel, then that example could be used in their own societies. People might say, “Well, if Hezbollah in Lebanon was able to defeat Israel, and Hamas in the occupied territories was able to defeat Israel, what does that mean for our control if that model takes root?”
I think that’s fundamentally why these Arab dictators have effectively allied themselves with Israel, because they view Palestinian nationalism as a threat; they view Palestinian armed resistance as a threat. Also, Arab leaders have learned that the way to get close to the United States is to ally yourself with Israel. The problem in doing so is facing the wrath of your citizens who have no interest in being allies with a country that is perceived as a colonial settler-state, an apartheid state and now a genocidal state.
Another major threat for Arab leaders is the fear of democracy. If ever there were an independent Palestinian state in the middle of the Arab and Islamic world that was truly independent and democratic, where people had a voice – and power was held accountable – this would pose an immense threat to the authoritarian order in the region. That is why you see countries like the United Arab Emirates at the forefront of efforts to support Israel in its policies in Gaza – because, in many ways, the Emirates is one of the most repressive authoritarian regimes in the Islamic world.
I think when the history of the Gaza genocide is written, one of the most distinguishing characteristics will be the complicitous role played by Arab and Muslim leaders. The full story of this has yet to been told properly. When Donald Trump announced his Gaza peace plan, he did so with the approval of leading Arab and Muslim countries, giving Trump and Israel a huge propaganda victory. They could then claim, “Look, this peace plan – which is really a neo-colonial plan to control Gaza – is not being imposed on the people of Gaza; it has the support of the Muslim world.” Now Trump has a United Nations Security Council resolution to back up this claim supported by Muslim leaders who endorsed the resolution.
There is a lot to say about this topic. A key fact stands out. During the Gaza Genocide that was live streamed in front of the entire world, Arab and Muslim leaders, instead of coming to the defense of the Palestinians, effectively supported Israel in its policy of conquest, control and mass slaughter. I tend to think that the question of Palestine and Gaza serves as a mirror reflecting the state of the Muslim world. The fact that you’re seeing this devastation happen before our eyes, and not one Muslim country – despite all of their massive armies, weapon systems, and armed capabilities – has used one bullet to stop this genocide, tells you how bad the problem is. There’s a lot to say on this issue, but those are the key arguments that stand out in my mind.
Muziru: Okay. Understand, However, from our point of view, Iran is the only Muslim government which fought Israel directly and indirectly with serious military power on three occasions, the last being the 12-day war. It also retaliated against the US attacks. Yet, you have recently mentioned that the Iranian attacks were more of a theatre and performance, rather than a genuine attempt at establishing deterrence which Israel seeks to do away with, so it can bomb all Muslim countries, including Iran, at will. You also described Iran as a paper tiger. Can you elaborate more on this and what led you to such conclusions?
Nader Hashemi: The 12-day war between Israel and Iran revealed that Iran is a very weak military power. On the first day of that war, the senior military leadership of Iran was killed. Iran didn’t have an air force capable of stopping Israel, nor did it have an air defense system. All it had were missiles. What we saw is that, despite the Iranian government and political system being very strong in terms of controlling society and repressing its own people, it is not strong in protecting its people from external attacks. This is very much a function of how authoritarian regimes operate in the Middle East. These regimes are strong when it comes to controlling their own societies, but not strong in terms of defending citizens them from outside threats. Over the years, Iran’s rhetoric on the suffering of the Palestinians has mostly been talk and bluster; it hasn’t translated into serious action or support for the Palestinians.
In fact, Iran’s incendiary rhetoric and unwillingness to openly support international law has given Israel an excuse to justify its repressive actions. The rhetoric of Iranian hardliners is used by Israeli hardliners to convince global public opinion that Iran is the number one threat to regional stability. These policies have made it easier for Netanyahu to pursue his expansionist policies in the region with strong Western support. I contrast Iran’s role with respect to justice in Palestine with South Africa. Look at what South Africa has done to support the Palestinians on the international stage. They have rooted their criticism of Israel in the international law and accountability for the crime of apartheid and genocide. They have gone to the international court of justice to demand accountability. They have spoken with clarity, with consistency, and they have help mobilized global civil society to stop the genocide in Gaza. South Africa can do these things because they are a democracy.
Why didn’t Iran or any other Arab or Muslim country file an application before the International Court of Justice against Israeli conduct in Gaza? The answer is simple. These are authoritarian regimes who by their nature reject the principle that there should be accountability for human rights violations. It requires a democracy to do this. It is not an accident or coincidence that a democratic South Africa was able to mobilize support for the Palestinians at the International Court, while no Arab country or Iran contemplated this move. The reason is simple: Because what South Africa did at the International Criminal Court was establish the principle that human rights violations by states should be judged and that there should be accountability. If you are an authoritarian leader, you do not want to be held accountable for your policies. In a very real sense South Africa’s case before the World Court poses a threat to autocratic regimes around the world, especially in the Middle East.
So, I don’t believe that Iran’s rhetoric of supporting the Palestinians – which has been very loud and consistent since the time of the revolution – has really helped the Palestinians. I think it has given Israel an excuse to continue its repressive policies. The best way to understand this is to ask the Palestinians themselves. I know many Palestinians from different walks of life, and they don’t believe Iran as their biggest defender. They understand that Iran has been victimized by the West, treated terribly by the West, unjustly attacked by Israel, and unfairly sanctioned, but they don’t believe Iran has truly been a strong defender of Palestinian human rights in a morally consistent way. I think most Palestinians I know would choose South Africa over Iran as a much more principled actor on the international stage when it comes to Palestinian rights.
Muziru: So, based on your arguments, can I say that the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 gave Netanyahu and Israel a reason to further expand their occupation of Palestine?
Nader Hashemi: Yes. Once that attack happened and given how devastating it was in terms of the atrocities committed by Hamas, it gave Netanyahu an excuse to “solve the Gaza problem” once and for all. Prior to October 7th, Netanyahu’s approach to Gaza was to keep the people of Gaza locked in an open-air prison and let them rot there. The international community was perfectly fine with this arrangement (including Arab leaders). When Hamas decided to stage that attack, everything changed. There is a famous saying in politics: you should never let a crisis go to waste. It presents an opportunity to do things that you normally cannot do in peace time. Netanyahu saw that opportunity and tried to seize it. He used the deaths of the 1,200 Israelis on that day to provide him with the perfect justification to once and for all “solve” the Gaza problem, with Western support. Looking back, it seems he has been successful in his mission.
But it’s important to remember that when we talk about the Israel-Palestine conflict we must not believe that this conflict began on Ocotber 7, 2023. It goes back at least to 1948 – and in my view, the more accurate starting point is 1917. To understand the topic objectively, we have to see it in its proper historical context.
Muziru: You have also described Iran as an “oppressive and authoritarian society”. However, Iran seems to be the most open and inclusive state with democratically elected parliament and president. Even Noam Chomsky once said that America’s allies in the Arab world are far worse and they deal with them. Why such a stand against Iran?
Nader Hashemi: That’s a good question. First of all, what Chomsky said is undeniably true, but remember he is measuring Iran’s political system by a very low standard. He’s saying, look, the standard in the Arab world in terms of free election and political openness is very low so by comparison, Iran is better. This is nothing to celebrate ethically or political if you care about democracy and human right. It’s true that the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently held elections for president and parliament while Saudi Arabia has not. Elections in Iran, however, have been fully free, in terms of allowing independent candidates to run for office. Intense ideological screen takes place by the Guardian Council. After this ideological screening, elections have been mostly fair, but evidence of vote rigging exists.
Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran is an extremely repressive regime. In 2025, for example, Iran has executed 1,200 people, and we’re still not at the end of the year. Iran executes more people than any other country in the world, except China. Iran’s human rights record is abysmal. Saudi Arabia’s human rights record is equally atrocious, as is Egypt’s human rights record under General El-Sisi bad, and of course, the government of Israel is committing genocide in Gaza as we speak. The question is: why does the United States/West direct its anger and criticism toward Iran and other repressive regimes in the region? The answer has nothing to do with human rights but rather everything to do with the fact that Iran is an independent player in the Middle East, pursuing its policy independent from the interests of the West. Because of this fact that Iran is an independent player that challenges Western interests, it is viewed as a threat that must be contained. Please note that when I say Iran is an independent player in the Middle East, that doesn’t mean it is a good actor, but simply that it pursues its policies without consulting or coordinating with Washington. Thus, because it pursues policies that challenges America’s allies in the region – I’m talking about Israel and the Arab states – it is viewed as a threat by the West.
A comparison can be made with Cuba. The reason why Cuba has been sanctioned for over 60 years by the United States is the exact same reason why Iran has been sanctioned and is perceived to be a threat to global stability. Cuba is an independent country. It’s a repressive state, but because it challenges America’s interests in Latin America by virtue of its independence, it is sanctioned and criticized. The same US foreign policy logic applies to Iran. If, for example, the US and Israel, were able to initiate regime change in Iran and restore the pro-American Pahlavi monarchy to power (which was very repressive), concern about Iran’s human rights would quickly evaporate in Western capitals.
Muziru: America and its Western allies, especially the British, seem to have for decades weaponized radical, extremist Islamist movements, from Afghanistan to Libya to Syria for the sake of regime changes and to pave the way for US strategy of balkanizing Iran to establishing an Israeli-policed US hegemonic order in West Asia. Yet, many Muslims in the west seem to go along with these policies, such as Operation Timber Sycamore in Syria. Why do you think this is the case? Can Muslim countries, and their ulama do something to stop Islam from being exploited for Western neo-colonial purposes?
Nader Hashemi: Well, one quarter of the planet today is made up of Muslims – 25 percent of the human population are Muslims. Even if you had every single ulama saying the right thing and doing the right thing in terms of ethical behaviour and conduct, that wouldn’t be able to control the behaviour of other Muslim groups and individuals who want to take up arms and commit acts of violence. I think Muslim behaviour has to be understood more locally and not generally. What matters is the national, regional, and local context in which you are trying to understand it how a particular group of Muslims are behaving.
So, for example, consider the rise of ISIS. This group emerges in Iraq and Syria. This is not a coincidence because these are some of the most brutalized parts of the Middle East. The nature of the post-colonial regimes that ruled over those societies, plus the chaos unleashed by the American intervention in Iraq, produced an explosion of anger and chaos, that resulted in the rise of ISIS, which was deeply informed by ultraconservative Wahhabi Islamic doctrine.
It is important to point out that I don’t believe that people in Iraq, Syria, or any country in the world are motivated strictly by their religious identity. Religious identities may be present – more in some cases, less in others – but people are fundamentally responding to local social conditions rooted in authoritarian politics, economic deprivation, repression, and the uncertainty and disorientation that come with the breakdown of states. This collective disorientation was evident in Iraq after the American invasion and in Syria under the House of Assad. For example, after ISIS emerged, there was a very famous letter called “Letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” written by 300 Islamic leaders rejecting that policies of ISIS and any connection to Islamic norms and values.
Thus, some Muslim leaders did speak out and condemn this form of extreme Islamic militancy. Did this protest letter stop ISIS from committing its atrocities and its violence? No. Because one of the realities of the Muslim world is unlike the Catholic church is that there’s not one central religious authority where all believers are required to follow in matters of belief and conduct. Anyone can claim religious authority and this is what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi did when he went into Mosul and he conquered it and he said, “I’m the new Caliph.” Some people listened to him. Most Muslims rejected what he was saying and doing. But this is the nature of the Muslim world today. There’s not one authority that can speak and then everyone listens. The case of Shia Islam is different.
Osama bin Laden can claim that he was a religious leader – some people followed him. The Grand Mufti of al-Azhar today claims he’s a religious leader. Some Muslims follow him. Iran’s Supreme Leader claims he has religious authority too. Some Muslims believe it; many do not. This is very much inbuilt into the nature of Muslim societies today. In a very real sense this overlaps with the question of religious authority in Protestant Christianity.
Muziru: What in your view can be done to reduce tensions among Muslims who have for decades now been indoctrinated to hate Shi’a Islam, when in reality we know that Shi’as are minority sect and Muslims should not fear Shi’a and should benefit from upholding pluralism and tolerance among its ranks, especially towards its Shi’a population. However, the opposite seems to be the case and Shi’as are particularly looked upon suspiciously in Indonesia and even in Malaysia where they are almost non-existent.
Nader Hashemi: One has to historicize this question. This obsession in Indonesia or in Malaysia with Shia Muslims is a recent problem. If you go back 40-50 years, you don’t see this problem. So the question is, why now? This is the classic social scientific question. When you’re trying to explain a particular behaviour, you have to ask why is this behaviour happening now and not at other times? So if you approach this question from this perspective you will see that there has been a deliberate attempt by some governments in the Muslim world to politicize sectarian identities in order to advance their national interests.
I’m talking specifically about the government of Saudi Arabia, which after the 1979 Iranian revolution, which Saudi Arabia viewed as a threat the ruling family, fearing that what happened in Iran could happen in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudi regime, use their petrodollars to disseminate a view in the Sunni Muslim world all Shi’a Muslims are heretics, that they are not really authentic Muslims, and that good Muslims should try and stop them, persecute them, and get rid of them if possible. This new interpretation of Islam, that is a derivate of Wahhabi Islam, was spread across the Muslim world and promoted in mosques, by giving scholarships to people in Indonesia/Malaysia to study in Saudi Arabia where they were taught this type of a warped understanding of Islam. They went go back and they spread this ideology at the local level.
There are many different manifestations of this. Governments that were losing control thought they could use a specific sectarianized identity to get their people to stop asking questions about democracy, human rights, and accountability – getting them to focus instead on religious identity and fear of an internal enemy. Pakistan under Muhammad Zia ul-Haq was an early example of this during the 1970s. Fundamentally, what we see happening now is a function of the policies of some Muslim governments that have invested in mobilizing people around these particular identity markers as a political distraction and deliberate strategy to retain political power.
How do you fight back against this? That’s the big question. I have written on this topic before, and I think the only way to fight back is to advance the struggle for democracy, openness, and free thought in the Muslim world. By educating people, by creating opportunities to discuss these issues, by encouraging different religious leaders to come together to talk about their similarities and differences, and by preventing authoritarian governments from pursuing these policies that seek to divide and conquer.
Thankfully, right now, as we speak, this problem is less intense than it was a few years ago. But at the height of the post-Arab Spring environment, with the rise of ISIS, it was very intense. In the early years after the Iranian revolution, during the 1980s, it was also very intense. It has gone up and down. Fundamentally, it’s a problem of democracy and citizenship rights. It’s not just a question of whether Sunni Muslim populations can tolerate Shia Muslims – it’s a question of what citizenship means in your country and basic moral questions relation to religious pluralism. Can you be a member of society with equal rights if you are from a religious minority? What if you are Bahai? What if you are Ahmadiyyah? Ismaili? An Atheist? These are deeply important moral questions that Muslims have to think about. So it’s much bigger than simply the Sunni-Shi’a question. It’s about how to coexist with others who are religiously and political different. It took the West a long time to work this problem out and now we can see the pendulum swinging back in the opposition direction in the age of authoritarian populism and fascism.
The last point I would make is that the community that is dominant, the majority, has a higher moral obligation to behave ethically toward minority groups because they have the power and the numbers. In the case of Iran, the government has a much higher moral obligation to treat its Sunni population fairly and equitably, because Sunnis are weaker and more vulnerable. The same applies in reverse: Sunni-majority populations must also be conscious of their moral obligation toward minority groups.
Muziru: I want to come back to your point on “free thoughts of the Muslim world.” Some right-wing people use their claim “right to freedom of speech” to persecute Shi’a and the minorities in their communities, hiding behind this so-called freedom of speech. What is your opinion about this?
Nader Hashemi: Look, I’m a big defender of freedom of speech. I don’t think people should be silenced. There is, of course, a question about hate speech – should it be restricted? I think there is an argument to be made that if you are actively promoting violence against another group of people, organizing people to actively persecute, harm, kill, or expel a group, then that speech should be limited. But if you simply want to criticize and say, “I don’t believe in this particular interpretation of Islam,” I think that is perfectly legitimate and it should be both tolerated and encouraged. Others should be able to respond to back to any criticism or critique, in a nonviolent manner. We live in a pluralized world; not everyone thinks or behaves the way you and I do.
One of the big moral and political questions is: How can we coexist with our differences? Is the only solution repression and violence? Is that the way forward? I don’t think so. We have to learn to tolerate our differences. We don’t have to like what others are doing in terms of their behavior, but we have to figure out a way of coexisting.
Muziru: Okay. So, last question. As per your talk to the IRF’s activists at Putrajaya last night on Zohran Mamdani: a minorty of the Jews of New York supported Mamdani’s election and he even received endorsement by some powerful Jews, who are openly Zionist but are opposed to the genocidal Netanyahu regime. At the same time, Mamdani is self-declared democratic socialist, but business, trade, and commerce are in his genes, being a Shi’a Muslim of a Khoja/Khawaja tradition. Could this model of Muslim political activism and ideology be used as a guiding model for the Muslim world, which is steeped in unwavering conservatism usually justified by Islam? Should Muslim societies use the Mamdani example as an inspiration to re-examine their own conservatism, or is it too utopian to imagine?
Nader Hashemi: I don’t think the problem is necessarily conservatism. I think, what we can learn from Mamdani is that to be a successful politician and human being, you have to take the question of justice seriously. And when you see a lot of injustice in your society, in the case of Mamdani, 25 percent of New Yorkers are living in poverty. What are you going to do? How are you going to respond? Are you going to just ignore it and say that’s your problem not mine? Are you going to say, “Look, as a political leader, I want to help poor people.” As I said last night in my talk, I think Mamdani’s politics is deeply informed by an Islamic ethical core because it’s rooted in the theme of affordability and the theme of helping working class people. It’s also rooted in the theme of standing up against injustice in Gaza and standing up against the repressive policies of Donald Trump and trying to make sure that everyone in his political community is treated fairly and has the same ability to live a dignified life – to own a home, to have access to food, have child care etc.
These policies that Mamdani has supported are rooted in a broad Islamic concept of justice. This is why so many Muslims can identify with his campaign. In Islam, one of the core pillars of faith is the concept of zakat (charity). What does zakat teaches us? Answer: the hoard of wealth is wrong and as is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. You must spread the wealth around; as Muslim you have a moral obligation to do this as a member of society. In Islamic tradition you also have the concept of the awqaf, the Muslim endowments. If you have a lot of money, you are encourage set up an endowment to help solve societal problems. So, I think, there’s a lot that Muslims can learn from Mamdani’s politics and ethics, especially his economic affordability agenda and his willingness to speak truth to power. The story of Moses vs. the Pharoah in the Qur’an comes to mind here.
The problem is that Muslims today are not taught to think in this way. Muslims think that to be a good Muslim is to focus on the outward manifestations of Islam – the hijab, whether you have a beard, how often one goes to the mosque etc. I’m not saying those things are unimportant, but there’s other values that are equally important, if not more important – suffering in society, stopping genocide, fighting against poverty, inequality, the concentration of wealth etc. I haven’t spoken to Mamdani about these issues but I suspect he would agree with my formulation.
Muziru: So it’s not about ideology? It’s about how you cater to the problems of the people?
Nader Hashemi: Yes. This is the core of Islam. In my understanding, Islam is supposed to be about more than simply reading the Qur’an, making du’a, or going to the mosque. It’s about social justice and political struggle to create a just society (for everyone, not just Muslims). If while you’re going to the mosque, there’s a poor person you pass along the way and you ignore him, will your prayers be valid? If there’s a genocide happening, where your government is complicit and you say, “Oh, I can’t be involved in this,” because my Islam is about ritual practice and nothing more, does this comport with the example of and teaching of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)? I have seen this many times among my Muslim groups who eschew direct political engagement because they believe it is distraction from worship. In my reading this a fundamental distortion of Islam.
Muziru: That is all Professor. Thank you for your time and we wish you the best for your new appointment.
